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Attorneys for Appellants 
Pursuant to Rule 35A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
and the Supreme Court's Notice in this matter dated August 21, 
1992, the respondent State of Utah, Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT"), submits the following Answer to 
Appellants1 Petition for Rehearing. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involves an action for damages for the wrongful 
deaths of several persons who were killed when their car collided 
with a Union Pacific train. Suit was brought against the railroad 
for negligent operation of its train and maintenance of the 
crossing, and against the Utah Department of Transportation for not 
sooner having installed lights and gates. The crossing, along with 
hundreds of others in the State of Utah, had been the subject of 
an engineering study by the UDOT and was scheduled for eventual 
upgrade. Because of financial constraints, however, that crossing, 
and many others, had not been upgraded before the plaintiffs1 
accident. 
After discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants, entering an extensive and well-
reasoned Memorandum Opinion in support of the granting of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals which 
affirmed, Duncan v. Union Pacific, 790 P.2d 595 (Ut.App. 1990). 
Plaintiffs petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ of 
Certiorari, which was granted. After briefing and argument, the 
Utah Supreme Court on April 6 of this year affirmed (Justices 
Stewart and Durham dissenting). 
The accident occurred in 1983; this case has been the subject 
of judicial scrutiny by the Utah courts for nearly a decade. After 
extensive discovery, briefing and argument, it has been decided by 
no fewer than seven Utah jurists that the plaintiffs are not 
entitled to recover. 
There is, after all, something to be said for finality of 
judgments, and a rehearing in a case which has received as much 
attention as this one should rarely be granted in absence of some 
rather egregious judicial oversight. Thus, Rule 35, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, requires that a Petition for Rehearing 
"shall state with particularity the points of law or fact which 
the petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or misapprehended 
it 
• . . • 
Appellants1 Petition for Rehearing asserts that the majority 
of this court overlooked or misapprehended controlling law as it 
relates to: (1) whether decisions regarding traffic control 
devices at railroad crossings are the exercise of a governmental 
function; (2) whether the UDOT exercised "discretion"; (3) whether 
the waiver of immunity found in Section 63-30-8 is qualified by the 
discretionary function exception to the waiver of immunity in 
Section 63-30-10; and (4) whether the Court's opinion is 
inconsistent with what the plaintiff describes as "laudatory tort 
theories and public policy concerns such as compensating parties 
injured through no fault of their own, and deterring hazardous 
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conditions by holding negligent [governmental] entities responsible 
for the blameworthy conduct," 
Contrary to appellants' assertions, however, the majority of 
this Court did indeed take note of the controlling law and relevant 
facts, and did not misapprehend or overlook either, 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION 
The majority opinion properly concluded that decisions 
relating to the types of warning devices to be installed at 
railroad crossings involve the exercise of discretion, for which 
immunity is retained by Section 63-30-10(1) of the Governmental 
Immunity Act. To reach that conclusion, the court, of necessity, 
had to conclude that such activities were also the exercise of a 
"governmental function." Otherwise, the discretionary function 
question need not have been addressed. 
Assuming that the issue was not waived by appellants, 
nevertheless the majority opinion acknowledged the issue and 
reached the proper conclusion, citing, inter alia, Richards v. 
Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985).x Standiford v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), does not require a different 
result. 
It is important to keep in mind that the Standiford test is 
a disjunctive proposition: the test for determining "governmental 
function" is "whether the activity under consideration is of such 
^Holding that the presentation of a timely Notice of Claim was 
required, which, of course, it would not have been if the activity 
in question (maintenance of traffic signs) was not "governmental." 
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a unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental 
agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental 
activity-" Arguably, decisions relating to upgrading railroad 
crossings are not "essential to the core of governmental 
activity."2 However, it is clear that the activities involved 
herein are of such a unique nature that they can only be 
effectively performed, as a practical matter, by a governmental 
agency. 
In interpreting the somewhat vague direction given by 
Standiford, subsequent decisions of this Court have made it clear 
that recreational activities, such as the operation of a golf 
course or a sledding hill, are not "governmental" (Standiford; 
Johnson v. Salt Lake City, 629 P.2d 432). The Court has also found 
activity to be not governmental when it is the type of activity 
which can be, and in fact is, carried out effectively by a 
nongovernmental agency such as, for example, supplying culinary 
water or collection of sewage (Bennett v. Bow Valley Development, 
797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990); Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 
(1982)). In reaching those conclusions, the Court noted that there 
was nothing uniquely governmental about such activities, nor was 
it even mandatory that a governmental entity perform those 
functions. The same cannot be said, however, of the activities of 
2Indeed, it is difficult to divine what sort of activity would 
be so "essential," short, perhaps, of collecting taxes and 
enacting, and enforcing laws. 
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the UDOT in the instant case. As noted by the Court of Appeals in 
Gleave v. Denver and Rio Grande, supra: 
UDOT is statutorily empowered to "provide for the 
installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving 
of automatic and other safety appliances, signals or 
devices at grade crossings," Utah Code Annotated § 54-
4-15.1 (1986), and to apportion costs of such projections 
among public and private entities, Utah Code Annotated, 
§ 54-4-15.3 (1986). The government alone must 
consistently regulate safety devices at railroad 
crossings, determine which devices at which crossings 
should be recommended for federal funding, rank crossings 
in order of need for upgrading in light of limited funds 
for that purpose, and apportion signal installation costs 
between public and private entities. As a practical 
matter, the private sector cannot perform these 
functions. Accordingly, we hold that the regulation of 
public safety needs and the evaluation, installation, 
maintenance and improvement of safety signals or devices 
at railroad crossings is a governmental function 
immunized from suit under Section 63-30-3 of the Act. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Neither the railroad nor any other nongovernmental entity has 
the power to determine what types of safety devices should be 
installed at railroad crossings. The mere fact that the UDOT may, 
within its discretion, require the railroad or some other involved 
entity to contribute toward the cost of the improvement does not 
detract from the fundamental doctrine, which is that activities and 
decisions which will impact on the citizenry at large, involve the 
prioritization of scarce financial resources, require consistency 
and uniformity, and deal with the safety of the traveling public, 
are, and must be, "governmental." 
Certainly it is true that there are some activities engaged 
in by the government which are not "governmental functions," such 
as the operation of a golf course, the maintenance of a sewage 
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system, supervision of disbursement of escrow funds, and the 
maintenance of a water supply system, all of which activities can 
be, and are, engaged in by private individuals. One looks in vain, 
however, for private individuals and companies who are engaged in 
long-range urban and demographic projections, the planning of 
highway systems, condemnation of property, and design, 
construction, and maintenance of highways, bridges, interchanges, 
railroad crossings, and similar structures.3 
This Court has both impliedly and expressly held that design, 
construction and maintenance of public thoroughfares is a 
governmental function. If such activities are not governmental, 
then the Court need never have discussed the necessity of a Notice 
of Claim, or whether the activity involved was "discretionary," as 
in Richards v. Leavitt, supra; Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 
(Utah 1980); Valesguez v. Union Pacific Railroad, 469 P.2d 5 
(1970); Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975); Carroll v. 
State Road Commission, 496 P.2d 888 (1972); Sears v. Southworth, 
563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977); See also, Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 111 
P.2d 800 (Utah 1941); Hurley v. Town of Bingham, 228 P. 213 (Utah 
1924) . 
Indeed, no other result is reasonable. To simplistically 
conclude that if some other entity could perform roughly the same 
function, that function is thus not "governmental," simply means 
3The UDOT is responsible for approximately 43,000 miles of 
public highways in the State of Utah, which accommodate 14.6 
billion vehicle miles of travel each year. UDOT Office of Policy 
and Systems Planning, Annual Statistical Summary (November 1991). 
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that there are virtually no activities of government which will be 
"governmental," as, obviously, nearly every activity which 
government undertakes could conceivably be undertaken by private 
persons. The fact that railroads may once upon a time have had 
more responsibility for the maintenance of crossings is irrelevant, 
as is the fact that in the early days of some states there were no 
public roads, but only private roads, for the use of which tolls 
were charged. Yet, in the real world, in twentieth-century Utah, 
the government has assumed, and the citizens expect, that 
government will be responsible, ultimately, for the State's highway 
transportation system. Clearly, the activity here at issue is 
"governmental," as it can only be, as a practical matter, performed 
by a governmental agency. Such conclusion is in no way contrary 
to the rationale of Standiford; the majority opinion reaches the 
correct and rational result, and is consistent with the Utah cases 
on the subject. 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
The majority of the Court neither overlooked nor 
misapprehended the facts or the controlling case law relating to 
the discretionary function issue. The majority opinion properly 
applied the four-part test of Little v. Department of Family 
Services, 667 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1983), and found that a basic 
governmental objective was involved (the promotion of public safety 
at railroad crossings), that the activity (prioritization) was 
essential to the realization of the objective, that the UDOT 
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exercised basic policy evaluation, judgment and expertise, and that 
the UDOT, obviously, had the necessary statutory authority. 
Appellants, however, continue to assert, as they did in their 
original brief, that the UDOT had decided to upgrade the crossing 
but "tragically failed to implement this decision . . . ." 
Appellants would, apparently, have this court believe that the 
UDOT, after deciding that the crossing needed to be immediately 
upgraded, simply sort of forgot to get around to doing what they 
had decided needed to be done immediately. Such is simply not the 
case. As was clearly established, the crossing in question was one 
of hundreds of crossings which were deserving of being upgraded. 
After an engineering study and a comparison of railroad crossings 
in the state needing improvement, this particular crossing was not 
rated high enough on the priority list so that it would be upgraded 
before the accident. To contend that deferring the upgrading of 
this particular crossing until other, more deserving, crossings had 
been upgraded constituted a negligent "failure to implement" is, 
to be charitable, illogical.* 
*The following example may be helpful in illustrating the 
logical flaw in appellants1 argument. First, it must be remembered 
that every railroad crossing is "dangerous" to some degree, as is 
every highway, be it two-lane rural road or state-of-the-art 
Interstate. Interstate highways are, presumably, safer than two-
lane rural highways, and a railroad crossing with train-activated 
gates and lights is, presumably, safer than a crossing which has 
only the standard warning devices as were present in the instant 
case. Assuming that the UDOT has long-range plans, but no present 
funding, to upgrade two-lane highways to Interstate standards, is 
the UDOT to be held accountable for a head-on accident on a two-
lane road because a decision was made to construct the Interstate 
in one area as opposed to the area where the accident occurred? 
Appellants apparently so contend. 
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While appellants contend that the Court ignored or overlooked 
relevant authority in concluding that the UDOT's activities under 
attack herein were "discretionary," it is respectfully submitted 
that the majority of the Court properly applied the controlling 
Utah cases. The Utah courts, over the years, have attempted to set 
forth what types of activities are discretionary and which are 
nondiscretionary. It has been held that the following decisions 
are "nondiscretionary": to use an earthen berm as the sole method 
of warning travelers of a cut in an abandoned road (Carroll v. 
State Road Commission, supra); preparation of plans and 
specifications and supervision of the manner in which construction 
work was carried out (Andrus v. State, supra); psychiatric care of 
an individual (Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980)); 
installation of defective traffic control semaphore system (Bigelow 
v. Ingersoll, supra); negligent operation of a backhoe (Irvine v. 
Salt Lake County, 123 U.A.R. 11 (1989)). On the other hand, the 
following types of decisions have been held to be discretionary: 
decisions to build a highway and the general location thereof 
(Andrus v. State, supra); decisions regarding the design, capacity 
and construction of a flood control system (Rocky Mountain Thrift 
v. Salt Lake City, 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989)); decisions relating 
to when to release a prisoner on work release (Epting v. State, 546 
P.2d 242 (Utah 1976)); the decision to require health inspections 
(Wilcox v. Salt Lake City, 484 P.2d 78 (Utah 1971)); failure to 
close a business under the Occupational Health and Safety Laws 
(White v. State, 579 P.2d 921 (1978)); and, of course, decisions 
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relating to installation of traffic control devices at railroad 
crossings (Valesguez v. Union Pacific Railroad, supra; Gleave v, 
Denver and Rio Grande, 749 P.2d 660 (Ut.App. 1988); Duncan v. Union 
Pacific Railroad, 790 P.2d 595 (Ut.App. 1990)). 
Appellants argue that Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City, 
supra, is not controlling, since the design of a flood control 
system is unlike the decisions made by the UDOT in the instant case 
relating to prioritization of railroad crossings. Appellants1 
primary criticism is that the UDOTfs surveillance team applied a 
"rigid mathematical formula . . . in prioritizing crossings," and 
that the use of the formula in some fashion distinguishes this case 
from Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City, supra. However, the 
UDOT should not be criticized for using an objective formula, 
regardless of whether it was rigid or mechanical. The use of such 
a formula attempts, to the extent possible, to reach rational, 
cost-effective conclusions based upon objective facts. As the 
majority opinion noted, M[T]he public is better served by a system 
such as that devised by UDOT, which takes into consideration all 
the crossings in Utah."5 
sAppellants cite a Federal District Court case as an example 
of yet another case rejecting the discretionary function immunity 
for decisions relating to railroad crossing devices, citing Armjo 
v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company, 754 F.Supp. 1526 
(D.C. N.M. 1990). That case, however, is totally irrelevant as 
interpreting dissimilar provisions of the New Mexico Governmental 
Immunity Act. Based upon the peculiar provisions thereof, the 
Federal Court merely observed that "from the Courtfs cursory look 
at this issue, it appears that the State of New Mexico would 
probably not enjoy sovereign immunity for these claims." In any 
event, the State of New Mexico was not even a party to the action, 
and the primary issue was the preemptive effect of the Federal 
Railroad Safety Act. 
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Presumably, appellants would not be happy with any formula, 
rigid or otherwise, unless that particular formula had moved the 
crossing in question to the top of the priority list. There is, 
of course, no assurance that such would have occurred no matter 
what formula was used, and the appellants' argument is dependent 
on speculation and twenty-twenty hindsight. The majority opinion 
reached the right conclusion. It is obvious that the activities 
of the UDOT herein complained of involve the rationing of scarce 
financial resources, the necessary prioritization of railroad 
crossing upgrading, and the exercise of basic policy evaluation, 
judgment and expertise in pursuit of a worthy, basic governmental 
objective. 
In a perfect world, all railroad crossings would have been 
upgraded many years ago, and neither the plaintiffs1 accident, nor 
any other similar accident, would ever have occurred. In the real 
world, with limited resources and a large number of railroad 
crossings, it is fundamentally unjust to impose liability on the 
UDOT simply because it did the best it could, using an objectively 
rational method, to prioritize railroad crossing upgrades. 
Plaintiffs, of course, merely argue that some other system should 
have been used, evidencing no concern that a premature upgrading 
of their crossing would delay upgrading somewhere else, and 
increase the possibility of another accident as bad or worse than 
the plaintiffs'. 
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A. The discretionary function exception of Section 63-30-10(1) 
modifies the waiver of immunity found in Section 63-30-8. 
Appellants assert that Richards v. Leavitt, supra, stands for 
the notion that the waiver of immunity found in Section 8 for 
dangerous roads, bridges, etc., stands on its own and is not 
qualified by Section 10, which retains immunity for the exercise 
of a discretionary function. However, Richards v. Leavitt does not 
stand for the proposition claimed by appellants, and as noted by 
the majority opinion, held only that the maintenance of an 
intersection and a stop sign were governmental functions, and a 
timely notice of claim was required under the Governmental Immunity 
Act; the question of discretionary function was not reached. 
A number of cases, however, have assumed that the 
discretionary function exception to liability will apply in claims 
involving an alleged dangerous road or highway. If Section 10 does 
not qualify Section 8, then there was no reason for this Court to 
discuss what is, and what is not, a discretionary function in, for 
example, Andrus v. state, Bigelow v. Ingersoll, Valesguez v. Union 
Pacific Railroad, Carroll v. State Road Commission, or Rocky 
Mountain Thrift v. Salt Lake City, supra. 
The majority opinion did not misapprehend or overlook the 
controlling authorities and, indeed, properly applied the 
established law of this state. In any event, if there was ever 
any doubt that Section 10 was meant to qualify Section 8, those 
doubts have been laid to rest by the 1991 clarification of 
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Section 8 which now specifically provides that it is qualified by 
the "exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-3-10." 
B. The majority opinion does not overlook the cumulative effect 
of its ruling, and it is consistent with public policy. 
Appellants' argument in Point II of the Petition for Rehearing 
is simply an appeal to emotion. It portrays the plaintiffs as 
victims: widows and orphans simply seeking just compensation for 
their emotional and financial loss from the State and a big 
railroad company for dangerous conditions "intentionally created 
because of monetary considerations." It is asserted that the 
result "unjustly denies recovery to the plaintiffs and to all 
future plaintiffs who find themselves similarly situated." While 
it is true that recovery will be denied to the plaintiffs herein, 
such a result is not necessarily "unjust." Appellants seem to 
forget that this unfortunate accident occurred only after the 
plaintiffs1 vehicle drove onto the main line of the Union Pacific 
Railroad after disregarding warning signs which were visible in 
their headlights for at least one-half mile; further, that the 
train which struck the plaintiffs1 vehicle could have been seen up 
the track for many thousands of feet and, in addition, was 
displaying a 300,000-candlepower headlight and a rotary beam on the 
top of the engine. A driver as apparently inattentive as the 
plaintiffs1 driver may very likely not have been saved by the 
enhanced warning system for which the plaintiffs so earnestly 
contend. 
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Under the circumstances of this case, it is not unjust to 
relieve the UDOT of liability to the plaintiffs. Indeed, the 
injustice would be to impose liability on the UDOT and the 
taxpayers of this state merely because the UDOT, through the 
application of an objective engineering study, determined that 
there were other railroad crossings more in need of expensive gates 
and lights than the one at which the subject accident occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no basis for the granting of the appellants1 Petition 
for Rehearing. A rehearing is only appropriate if in fact the 
Court has overlooked or misapprehended some relevant points of law 
or fact. The majority opinion accurately stated the fundamental 
facts and applied well-established law. Appellants1 Petition for 
Rehearing is merely a rehash of arguments previously made, enhanced 
by some quotes from the dissenting opinion. The Petition for 
Rehearing does not set forth any valid reason for subjecting the 
parties and the Court to yet more briefing and argument. The 
Petition should be denied. 
DATED this % day of So^gV^J^v 1992. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By (/MA** 
L. Larson 
for Respondent 
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